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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
OUR composite system of corporate and personal taxation has been for
some years the target of criticism from opposite directions. Some critics
contend that it results in excessively heavy "double taxation;"* others
argue that it enables the rich, by corporate retention of earnings, to
avoid high upper-bracket personal tax rates and thereby to lower their
tax burden. This study attempts to assess the quantitative evidence
that bears on these contentions.
Such questions of equity inevitably arise from differencestax
treatment, and it is a fact that the federal tax laws treat a stockholder's
corporate earnings differently from other sources of income. A brief
historical review will clarify the problem.
At.no time since 1913 has our income tax structure (corporate and
personal combined) provided for complete equivalence of tax liability
between corporate earnings and other categories of income. But an
initial attempt at income tax equivalence was made for the distributed
component of corporate earnings. The personal income tax act of 1913
exempted dividends from normal tax. Both the tax rate on corporate
income and the normal tax rate on personal income were set at 1 per
cent; thus for distributed earnings the corporate tax operated as
a withholding feature of the personal levy. This treatment continued
through 1918, as increases in the personal normal rate were matched
by increases in the corporate rate,' with these exceptions: a corporate
rate greater than the personal normal rate in 1917, and on the first
$4,000 of normal tax income in 1918. But from 1919 on, the corporate
rate exceeded the personal normal rate and thus the corporate tax
became, in part, a separate and distinct levy on distributed corporate
earnings.2 The rate gap widened gradually until 1936 when the bridge
'See footnote 1, page xi of Preface.
even during this period, failure to include the corporate tax payment as
part of the personal income surtax base led to a slight measure of differential taxa-
tion of distributed corporate earnings. For example, in 1916, corporate earnings of
$1,000 were subject to a 2 per cent corporate tax and when the remaining $980 was
received by a taxpayer in the 5 per cent surtax bracket, a personal income tax of
$49 was due, making a total tax liability of $69. Coming from another source, the
same sum would have been subject to $70 of personal income tax(2 per cent
normal and 5 per cent surtax). Again, in this same year. corporate earnings of $1,000
in the 10 per cent surtax bracket were subject to a corporate tax of $20 and a
personal tax of $98(i.e. 10 per cent of the $980 distributed as dividends), or $118
in all. On the same amount from other sources the levy was $120 ($20 of normal
tax and $100 of surtax).
2 In some years between 1919 and 1986, at the higher income levels this led, how.
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between the two taxes was removed completely by the abolition of the
dividend exemption. A return to something like the 1919-1936 pro-
cedure was instituted by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in the
form of a tax credit based on But, here too, a sub-
stantial gap exists between the personal income tax credit and the rate
of corporate tax. Therefore, since 1919 the distributed earnings of
corporate enterprises have been treated differently from the other
sources of income for federal income tax purposes:4 from 1919 to 1936,
because the corporate rate was higher than the personal normal rate;
from 1936 through 1953, because corporate earnings were taxed at the
corporate level when earned with no allowance at the personal level
when distributed; and from 1954 on, because the personal income tax
relief accorded distributed earnings falls short of the corporate tax rate.
As for the undistributed component, non-equivalence has always
been the rule. The personal marginal rates that would have applied
if retained earnings had been distributed progressive, and the
corporate rate actually levied on retained earnings was, in general,
proportional, so that at all but one particular level of stockholder
income they were dissimilar. In addition, capital gains taxation
tended either to aggravate this discrepancy at the lower income levels
or to moderate it, albeit very imperfectly, for stockholders with high
taxable incomes. The adjustment on this score was at best very loosely
geared to the stockholder's personal income status. For retentions do
not show up systematically in share prices; not all such increments
are realized in taxable form; and even when so realized, they have
been subject, over the period of the income tax, to a variety of special
rate provisions.
The present study is an attempt to develop a measure of the
"unequal" burden on stockholders caused by the different tax treat-
ment accorded the net corporate earnings component of their incomes.
ever, to undertaxation of distributed corporate earnings. Because the corporate tax
liability was not included in the personal surtax base, ".,. thededuction of the
corporation tax from the reportable dividends reduced the surtax payable below what
it would be were no tax collected at source. The corporation income tax rates were
usually somewhat higher than the top normal tax rates, so that this advantage was
usually offset; nevertheless, in some years the net result was still that in the highest
brackets the dividend recipient was more lightly taxed than the salary or interest
recipient, even including the burden of the corporation income tax and assuming
all earnings to be currently distributed'S (William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive
Taxation, Ronald, 1947, p. 153).
3TheInternal Revenue Code of 1954 established an exclusion from taxable in-
come of the first $50 of dividends ($100 for joint returns) and a credit against per-
sonal income tax of 4 per cent of dividends in excess of the excluded amount.
4 Differential taxation before 1918, because of the failure to include the corporate
tax in the personal income tax base, was very small.
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Its purpose is not to examine all the features of our tax system that
may lead to differential levies on various sources of personal income,
such as, for example, the social security taxes which are levied on wages
and salaries, or tax-exempt interest. The study is limited to the analysis
of the differential burden on stockholders caused by the existence of
one income tax at the corporate level and another at the personal level.
it leaves out of account the tax on intercorporate dividends.)
The magnitudes here are large, and thus a matter of continuing
concern in tax policy. While concentrating on the period 1940-1952
(primarily because it is the most recent for which data are available),
the relevant changes made by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will
be examined in Chapter 7.
Statistical measurement of the differential rates involved is a formi.
dable enterprise and can be ventured only with the aid of assumptions
whose relevance and, reliability must be examined in detail later. The
main aim can be put very simply by two questions: How heavily,
compared with other sources of income, have corporate earnings been
taxed? How heavily, compared with other taxpayers, have stockholders
been taxed? These questions may be put in a somewhat different way:
How much greater (or less) was the tax liability on the stockholder's
share of corporate earnings and his total income than the tax that
would have been due had his pro rata portion of net corporate earn-
ings been reached fully and promptly by the personal income tax
alone?
We shall find, for example, using one possible measure (the measure
that, despite many qualifications to be considered in the chapters that
follow, was judged most appropriate to the problem at hand) that, in
1950, a married stockholder with an income of $5,000 from all sources,
of which $975 was from corporate had a combined corporate-
personal income tax liability $304 greater than he would have paid
had the $975 been income from other sources subject only to the
personal income tax. This differentially heavier tax load represented
31.2 per cent of the corporate earnings component of his income and
6.1 per cent of his total income. So at this income level, on average,
corporate earnings were taxed almost one-third more heavily than
income from other sources; and the income tax for stockholders was
six percentage points heavier than it would have been had their pro
rata share of net corporate earnings been subject in full to the personal
income tax alone.
In the same year, but at the $500,000 stockholder income level, the
5 Defined as his pro rata share of pre-tax corporate net income, i.e. the sum of
corporate tax, dividends, and retained earnings.
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findings are very different. Here the typical married stockholder paid
a tax $70,055 lower than he would have paid had an increment to his
income the size of his pro rata share of corporate earnings ($440,500)
been subject to the personal income tax alone. He received a differen-
tial tax advantage equal to about 16 per cent of the corporate earnings
component of his income and about 14 per cent of his total income.
These results are cited here to show the type of measures used rather
than as representative of the findings. Nor should they be accepted
without an examination of the qualifications discussed in Chapters 2
and 4, and Appendix B. If the corporate income tax is shifted, wholly
or in part, the extra burdens just cited are too high. If corporate in-
come is defined to allow for current costs of maintaining inventories
and replacing depreciable assets, they are too low. How accurately the
underlying basic assumptions of this study reflect the complex nature
of our tax system is, of course, a matter each reader will wish to assess
for himself. These assumptions and a number of alternatives which
would change the findings are examined in Chapter 4.
In deriving the basic measures it is assumed that corporation income
taxes are not shifted but constitute a burden on the stockholders, i.e.,
that the corporate income tax reduces by an equivalent amount what
could otherwise have been distributed to stockholders. There is, of
course, no unanimity of opinion about where the corporation income
tax falls. If shifted, it rests on the purchasers of finished commodities,
or the suppliers of raw materials and productive services, or both,
rather than on corporate earnings. That the corporate income tax
rests on profits is probably still the most prevalent view among students
of public finance (though other opinions are also strongly held). It
is, of course, the incidence assumption usually implicit in the conten-
tion that corporate earnings are overtaxed or differentially taxed.
So, at best, this study is a partial job. In the main it is based on that
assumption about incidence which, if valid, makes either double- or
overtaxation a meaningful charge. While the results under an alterna-
tive shifting assumption are also investigated, most of the study's
findings must be interpreted in the light of the non-shifting assump.
don. The complex problem of incidence is examined in greater detail
in Chapter 4.
The study is shaped by the view that any evaluation of the relative
tax load on net corporate earnings must take into account both the
distributed and undistributed portions of these earnings. Investi-
gations of the weight of the corporate-personal tax system have usually
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INTRODUCTION
Those who focus on distributed earnings (dividends) argue that
because such income is subject to two sets of income taxes it is taxed
more heavily than income from other sources. For example, only one
tax is assessed on the interest paid to owners of corporate bonds—the
tax paid by the owner himself; the corporation is permitted to deduct
the interest payments from its income tax base; but no such deduction
is permitted for dividend payments.6 This is the reasoning behind the
charge phrased variously as the double-taxation of dividends, dis-
tributed earnings, or corporate earnings. It was one of the reasons
for the relief provisions recently incorporated in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. As President Eisenhower summarized it in his Budget
Message to Congress for the fiscal year 1955: "At present, business
income is taxed to both the corporation as it is earned and to the
millions of stockholders as it is paid out in dividends. This double
taxation is bad from two standpàints. It is unfair and it discourages
investment."7
Those who concentrate on the undistributed part of corporate earn-
ings argue differently. They contend that because the corporate rate
is below the personal rate at high income levels, upper-bracket tax-
payers can, through corporate retention of earnings, avoid high per-
sonal surtax rates (paying, at most, only the lower capital gains tax).
Such was the emphasis behind President Roosevelt's initial proposal
of an undistributed profits tax in 1936: "The accumulation of surplus
in corporations controlled by taxpayers with large incomes is encour-
aged by the present freedom of undistributed corporate income from
surtaxes. Since stockholders are the beneficial owners of both dis-
tributed and undistributed corporate income, the aim, as a matter of
fundamental equity, should be to seek equality of tax burden on all
corporate income, whether distributed or withheld from the beneficial
owners."8
To remedy. the omissions inevitable in either of these points of view,
the position is adopted, for purposes of this tax burden comparison,
that earnings, both distributed and undistributed, should be con-
sidered as allocable to the individual taxpayers in the various income
brackets who actually own the stock of United States corporations, in
proportion to their holdings as measured by their dividend receipts.
8 Exceptions: Dividends paid out of capital(i.e. disbursements in excess of ac-
cumulated profits and earnings) are not taxed as income to the stockholder. Divi-
dends paid on the preferred stock of public utilities issued prior to 1942 are exempt
from a portion of the corporate tax.
7 The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June
30, 1955, 1954, p. M18.
8 Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1936, p. 3146.
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IINTRODUCTION
It follows that the tax which these corporations pay on their earnings
should also be considered as a part of the tax burden of the individual
stockholders. These are the assumptions behind the basic method em-
ployed, which imputes all corporate earnings (dividends, corporate
savings, and corporate taxes) to individual stockholders, and correla-
tively adds corporate taxes to their income tax liability. Use of that
method for analytical purposes carries no implication as to the desira-
bility or feasibility of treating the owners of corporations as members
of a partnership and imputing both corporate earnings and corporate
taxes to them annually as part of their taxable personal income. The
sole reason for using the device of imputation is the belief that the
quantitative weight of the special tax treatment of corporate earnings
can best be measured by relating this income share to the income level
of its claimants.
A number of factors—particularly legislated tax rates, variations in
the ebb and flow of economic fortune, and corporate distribution
practices—enter into the determination of the differential tax load on
stockholders. By an appropriately judicious choice of illustrative data,
either over- or undertaxation can be demonstrated. This being the
case, it seemed sensible to use the most realistic data available, the
annual Internal Revenue Service tabulations from tax returns as
published in Statistics of Income.
The measures developed in this study are directed to a comparison
of the combined federal corporate-personal income tax on the net
corporate earnings component of stockholders' income with the tax
that would have been due ifthis income share had been subject
promptly and in full to the personal income tax alone. If the sum of
the personal income tax on dividends and the corporate tax on net
corporate earnings exceeds the potential personal income tax on an
increment of taxable income the size of net corporate earnings, the
conclusion is that the stockholder was overtaxed. The findings do not
refer to specific stockholders but to typical stockholders representing
the aggregate experience at a number of income levels, 19 in all, rang-
ing from $1,000 to $500,000.
To take account of the wide variability in the important underlying
factors—tax rates, profit levels, and dividend pay-out ratios—com-
parisons were made for every one of the years in the period 1940
through 1952 (except 1942 and 1943 as noted previously). This period
covers the years from the earliest to the most recent (at the time of
writing) for which sufficiently detailed data were available. Wide
differences encountered over the period of the study include: effective
rates of corporate tax (calculated on a net basis for the earnings of
8
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per cent in 1947 to around 60 per cent in 1944; net corporate earnings
(before corporation income taxes) imputable to taxable stockholders
ranging from about $5 billion in 1940 to $31 billion in 1951; dividends
reported by personal income taxpayers of $3.1 billion in 1940 and $6.8
billion in 1950; dividends as a per cent of net corporate earnings
(before corporation income taxes) of 19 per cent in 1944 to 59 per
cent in 1940; personal income tax rates starting at 4 per cent at the
first bracket and reaching 79 per cent at the top in 1940 compared
with the 1944 (and 1945) rate schedule which spanned a range from
23 per cent to 94 per cent.
But the values for these years do not, in some cases, reach the
extremes of earlier years. In particular, there is nothing in the years
1940-1952 like the corporate earnings experience of the early thirties.
In 1930, 1931, and 1932, corporate earnings as a whole were negative,
but taxes were levied on the income of net income corporations and
the dividend receipts of individuals. Without performing any elabo-
rate calculations, it can be concluded that in those three years the
differentially heavier taxation of stockholders was more severe than
in any of the years covered by this study. About its comparative level
in other years not covered by our study no simple a priori statement
can be made.
WHAT ARE THE MAGNITUDES INVOLVED?
The aggregate data that follow cast little light on the issues of tax
liability equality that arise from the existence of the corporation income
tax. Findings germane to such issues will be examined in the chapters
that follow. But the data in Tables 1 and 2 provide background in-
formation on the magnitudes involved in the problem to be studied.9
Typically, for the period covered by the study, about three million
dividend recipients annually were subject to personal income tax, and
therefore, in some sense, double taxed.'° These are the stockholders
enumerated in Table 1, line 1. Crediting to them their pro rata share
9 The entries in these tables are estimates for the "double-taxedsegment, i.e.,
stockholders who paid personal income taxes. More precisely, these "stockholders"
are taxpayers who receive some or all of their income from dividends; throughout,
the phrases recipients" and "stockholders" are used synonymously (see
Appendix B for an explanation of the methods used in estimating the entries in the
tables).
10 The data on this score are not completely homogeneous. Starting in 1948 with
the introduction of permissive income splitting for joint returns, a number of mar-
ried dividend recipients who had filed separately to minimize liabilities now filed
jointly, thus reducing the number of stockholders (as the term is here used). This



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of net corporate earnings leads to a considerable increase in income."
This is demonstrated by the aggregate figures (lines 2 and 4) and by
the derived averages (lines 3 and 5). In 1950, for example, the average
income as reported for personal income tax (adjusted gross income)
of stockholders was $9,896; after full imputation of net corporate earn-
ings the average was $16,983.
Not only were net corporate earnings a much larger total than
dividends; they were also considerably more volatile. Dividends re-
ceived by taxable stockholders ranged from $3.1 to $6.8 billion; net
corporate earnings from $5.3 to $31.2 billion; between 1948 and 1949
dividends went up by around 7 per cent, but net corporate earnings
fell by over 17 per cent (lines 11 and 14).
For analytical purposes net corporate earnings have been broken
down into two components—earnings for distribution and earnings for
retention. Earnings for distribution are defined here as the amount of
pre-corporate tax earnings required for payment of dividends. For
example, with the corporate rate at 50 per cent, two dollars must be
earned for every dollar of dividends paid. Similarly, earnings for reten-
tion are the pretax counterpart of retained earnings. Earnings for
distribution are clearly double—taxed (but, of course, not twice as
heavily)—once at the corporate level and again when received as
dividends. Earnings for retention, while not double taxed, may be
over- or undertaxed depending on what would have been the rate
applicable to this income share had it been taxed as part of the
personal income of stockholders. Both earnings for distribution and
earnings for retention represent sizeable additions to stockholders' in-
come. (With dividends already included in stockholders' income, only
the corporate tax on earnings for distribution constituted a net addi-
tion.) It is apparent, however, that the latter constituted (in all but
the earliest two years of our period) a larger sum annually (compare
lines 12 and 13). This suggests that simple, a priori conclusions about
the overtaxation of stockholders are not easily drawn. Different results
will characterize stockholders at various income levels. Careful analysis
is in order.
Crediting stockholders with their full pro rata share of net corporate
earnings also calls for inclusion of the corporate tax in their income
iiWhilein every year covered by the study there were net retained earnings (af-
ter corporation income taxes), for imputed gross income to be greater than adjusted
gross income it is necessary, merely, that the algebraic sum of retained earnings and
corporation income taxes be positive. For, as the term is here used, net corporate
earnings equal the sum of dividends, undistributed earnings, and corporate income
taxes. This usage, though it departs from the customary definition,is the most
logical and useful for the present purposes.
12
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tax load. The corporate income tax is significant, involving a con-
siderable adjustment. In all the years investigated, the total imputed
corporate tax outweighs the personal income tax for stockholders (see
lines 6 and 7). Thus, assuming the incidence of the corporate income
tax to be on shareholders, it appears that when full account is taken
of corporate earnings and federal income taxes thereon, stockholders,
in the aggregate, were subject to effective rates of income taxation
considerably higher than those of the personal income tax (compare
lines 9 and 10). Indeed, in some years the combined corporate-personal
rate was more than twice the personal rate and it never was less than
30 per cent greater.
But useful as they are for indicating that ours is no insignificant
question, these aggregate data do not get at the heart of the problem.
For assessing the equality or inequality of the income tax load on
stockholders and other taxpayers with similar incomes, the aggregate
data of Table I have two primary faults. They fail to make allow-
ance for the progressive nature of the personal income tax structure,
and they overstate the burden of the corporate income tax.
We should expect larger incomes, i.e., those which include fully
imputed net corporate earnings as part of personal income, to be taxed
at higher rates than those which include only dividends, for the
standard of comparison—the personal income tax—is progressive. Thus
the question as to whether (and, if so, to what extent) stockholders
are overtaxed is not answered by the statistics in Table 1. To answer
this question the aggregates must be broken down and the tax burden
on stockholders at specific income levels analyzed. More particularly,
to determine the difference in burden (positive or negative) on stock-
holders, their actual tax liability under the combined corporate.
personal income tax is compared with the tax they would have been
liable for had their pro rata share of net corporate earnings, along
with the rest of their income, been subject promptly and in full to
the personal income tax alone.
In this procedure it is recognized that the corporate tax constitutes
a net levy on stockholders smaller than its face amount. If it is assumed
to rest on profits, shareholders are deprived of income (either actual
or potential). But if no such tax existed, and instead all of corporate
earnings were includible in the personal income of stockholders for
tax purposes, there would be an increase in personal income tax lia-
bility due to the inclusion in the personal income tax base of that
portion of net corporate earnings that presently goes to meet corporate
tax payments.12 Similarly, personal income tax liability would increase
12 The interrelation of the corporate and personal income tax has been lucidly
13INTRODUCTION
because of the imputation of retained earnings. Therefore, in deriving
the measures of the differential tax burden on stockholders, the poten-
tial personal income tax on retained earningsisalso taken into
account.
Further information on the significant changes in incomes of stock-
holders that follow from considering all of corporate earnings and
not merely the distributed portion is furnished in Table 2. The year
1950 was chosen as the most recent for which data were available
when this analysis was made. The data for stockholders have been classi-
fied and worked up on two bases: first, in terms of the personal income
tax income concept, adjusted gross income, which includes dividends
reported on personal returns as the measure of personal income from
TABLE 2
Distribution of Adjusted Gross Income and Imputed Gross Income, Dividend




ADJUSTED number returns returns Per centCumulative %
CROSS taxable reporting as % ofof dividendof dividend
INCOME CLASS returns dividendsall returnsreturns returns
($000's) (1) (2) (8) (4) (5)
Under 1 1,570,113 29,419 1.9 0.89 0.89
1and under2 5,996,778 211,605 3.5 6.42 7.81
2and under8 8,717,908 351,286 4.0 10.66 17.97
3and under4 8,668,606 437,463 5.0 13.27 31.24
4and under5 5,740,400 428,272 7.5 12.99 44.23
5and under10 6,114,699 1,055,136 17.3 32.01 76.24
10and under25 1,074,970 550,460 51.2 16.70 92.94
25and under50 220.107 159,918 72.7 4.85 97.79
50and under 500 82,259 72,127 87.7 2.19 99.98
500and over 842 838 99.5 0.03 100.00
Total 38,186,682 3,296,524 8.6 100.00 100.00
For source, see below.
corporate activity; and secondly, in terms of an income concept, im-
puted gross income, in which the full pro rata share of net corporate
earnings, instead of dividends,13 is used as a measure of personal
income from corporate activity and as the basis for classification.
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demonstrated by Richard B. Goode in The Corporation Income Tax (Wiley, 1951,
pp. 90-91).
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Cumula- income Per centtive %
ADJUSTED Amount ofPercenttive % of stock- of AGIa of AGJ
GROSS dividendsof totalof total holders of stock-of stock.
INCOME dividendsdividends (fI000's) holdersholders
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 10,232 0.15 0.15 24,565 008 0.08
1 and under2 90,837 1.33 1.48 331,448 1.02 1.09
2 and under3 180,943 2.65 4.12 887,481 2.72 3.81
3 and under4 216,677 3.13 7.29 1,521,934 4.66 8.48
4 and under5 224,822 3.29 1038 1,906,667 5.84 14.32
5 and under10 877,308 12.83 23.41 7,076,665 2L69 36.01
10 and under25 1,445,631 21.14 44.55 8,017,450 24.57 60.58
25 and under50 1,180,820 17.26 61.81 5,394,994 16.53 77.12
50 and under 500 2,184,657 31.94 93.75 6,621,792 20.29 97.41
500 and over 427,587 6.25 100.00 844,953 2.59 100.00
Total 6,839,514 100.00 100.00 32,627,949 100.00 100.00
a Adjustedgross income.
For source, see below.
Table 2. continued
ADJUSTED GROSS INCOMEBASIS, concluded
Average imputed
ADJUSTED GROSS Dividends Average AGIa gross income
INCOME as % of AGIa of stockholders per AG! class
($000's) (12) (13) (14)
Under 1 41.7 $ 835 $2,023
1 and under2 27.4 1,566 3,033
2 and under 3 20.4 2,526 4,286
3 and under4 14.2 3,479 5,171
4 and under5 11.8 4,452 6,245
5 and under10 12.4 6,707 9,547
10 and under25 18.0 14.565 23,536
25 and under50 21.9 33,736 58,959
50 and under500 33.0 91,807 195,280
500 and over 50.6 1,008,297 2,751,206
a Adjustedgross income.
For source, see below.
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Table 2, continued
IMPUTED GROSS INCOME BASIS
Number
taxable Per cent Cumulative
IMPUTED GROSS turns reporting of dividend % of dividend
INCOME dividends returns returns
($000's) (15) (16) (17)
Under 1 9,766 0.80 0.80
1 and under2 93,379 2.83 3.13
2 and under3 224,976 6.82 9.95
3 and under4 279,278 8.47 18.43
4 and under5 438,489 18.30 31.73
5 and under10 1,100,845 33.39 65.12
10 and under25 745,337 22.61 87.73
25 and under50 235,316 7.14 94.87
50 and under 500 164,773 5.00 99.87
500 and over 4,362 0.13 100.00
Total 3,296,521a 100.00 100.00
a Differsfrom Column 2 because of rounding.
For source, see below.
Table 2, continued
IMPUTED GROSS INCOME BASIS, continued
Amount of
corporate Per cent of Cumulative %
IMPUTED CROSS earnings net corporateof net corporate
INCOME CLASS ($000's) earnings earnings
($000's) (18) (19) (20)
Under 1 1,709 0.06 0.01
1 and under2 31,312 0.10 0.11
2 and under3 128,982 0.43 0.54
3 and under4 183,620 0.61 1.15
4 and under5 889,636 1.29 2.44
5 and under10 1,945,637 6.44 8.88
10 and under25 4,395,388 14.55 23.43
25 and under50 4,417,861 14.63 38.06
50 and under 500 13,614,454 45.08 83.14
500 and over 5,093,281 16.86 100.00
Total 30,201,880 100.00 100.00
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IMPUTEDGROSS INCOME BASIS, concluded
IGTh of
IMPUTED GROSS stockholders Per cent Cumulative
INCOME CLASS of IGI % of IGI
(21) (22) (23)
Under 1 9,483 0.02 0.02
1 and under2 161,448 0.29 0.51
2 and under8 599.478 1.07 1.38
S and under4 1,001,241 1.79 3.16
4 and under5 1,987,254 3.55 6.71
5 and under10 7,692,079 13.74 20.45
10 and under 25 11,582,389 20.69 41.14
25 and under50 8,422,958 15.04 56.18
50 and under 500 19,179,004 3425 90.48
500 and over 5,356,544 9.57 100.00
Total 55,991,878 100.00 100.00
b Imputed gross income.
Source: Columns 1.14, except columns 2 and 9, Statistics of Income for 1950 Part
I, Bureau of Internal Revenue; Column 2 figures are the numbers of returns re-
porting dividends plus estimated numbers reporting income from estates and trusts
derived in part from dividends; Column 9 is computed with the assumption that, in
each income class, stockholders (dividend recipients) and other taxpayers have the
same average income; Columns 15-23 are derived from Statistics of Income, op. cit.,
by a series of procedures explained in Chapter 2, and Appendix B.
upward when all of corporate earnings are included.(Compare
columns 2 and 15, 8 and 20, and 11 and 23.) The distributions arrayed
by imputed gross income are considerably more concentrated than
the adjusted gross income distributions. Interesting too is the wide
gap between the average imputed gross income and the average ad-
justed gross income in each adjusted gross income class(see columns
13 and 14). The figures in column 14 are not rearrayed by imputed
gross income classes but are listed according to the adjusted gross
income classes from which they were derived. The imputed gross
income counterpart is, of course, higher in every adjusted gross income
class, but the differences become increasingly pronounced as adjusted
gross income increases. This is a reflection of the fact that, except for
the four lowest income classes, dividends account for a constantly
increasing proportion of adjusted gross income as that income
One further point stands out from the data of Table 2. For 1950
(and there is nothing unusual about this year), over half of all divi-
14 At the lower income levels there are relatively few dividend returns. The high
proportion of dividends to total income in these classes may be explained by the
high proportion of pensioners and other non-working persons for whom property
income, including dividends, would be a major source of income.
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dends and over three quarters of corporate earnings fall in the income
classes over $25,000. Likewise, about 40 per cent of adjusted gross
income and nearly 60 per cent of imputed gross income is found in
the $25,000 and over segment of the income array. The number of OnCeptu
stockholders here, however, is small—7 per cent on an adjusted gross
and 12 per cent on an imputed gross income basis. This means that FOR understandu
we shall have to pay more attention to the upper income ranges and qualifications
examine the upper tail of this distribution more thoroughly and with a brief explanati
more detailed income class breakdowns than is either usual or neces- ceptual framewor
sary in more general studies of income distribution or tax burden. a brief explanati
As noted earlier,this introductory section was not designed to how the findings
discuss the findings of the study. It proposes merely to set forth the in the next two
problem and suggest the framework in which it will be analyzed. In and emphasize it
view of disparate opinions regarding the equity of the income tax and procedures a
structure as it bears on stockholders, because of the complexities under-
lying the concepts of overtaxation and undertaxation, and because 1N1
the magnitudes involved are large, it is clear the problem is significant. All the data are fr
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